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Introduction
In this note we describe an interdisciplinary research project
that uses logic to investigate psychological reasoning tests
called false-belief tasks. Logical proofs, built according to
the rules of a precisely defined proof-system, have been used
for over a century to represent—describe the structure of—
mathematical reasoning; nowadays there is increasing inter-
est in using them to analyze reasoning in everyday human
practice. The goal of our project is to analyze and give logi-
cal formalizations of false-belief tasks using a range of modal
proof-systems, and moreover, to use such logical analyses as
a basis for empirical studies of how children with Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) reason in false-belief tasks.
A well known example of a false-belief task is the Sally-
Anne test:
A child is shown a scene with two doll protagonists, Sally
and Anne, having respectively a basket and a box. Sally
first places a marble into her basket. Then Sally leaves
the scene, and in her absence, Anne moves the marble
and puts it in her box. Then Sally returns, and the child
is asked: “Where will Sally look for her marble?”
Children above the age of four typically give a correct re-
sponse to this task: they say that Sally will look in the bas-
ket, which is where Sally (falsely) believes the marble to be.
Younger children, on the other hand, say that Sally will look
in the box: this is indeed where the marble is, but this infor-
mation is not available to Sally and hence the response is in-
correct. For children with ASD, the shift to correct responses
usually occurs at a later age.
Passing the Sally-Anne test involves taking the perspec-
tive of another agent, namely Sally, and reasoning about what
she believes. So to speak, you have to put yourself in Sally’s
shoes to get the answer right. Since the ability to take a differ-
ent perspective is a precondition for figuring out the correct
answer to the Sally-Anne (and other) false-belief tasks, the
fact that children with ASD have a higher cutoff age is taken
by some researchers to support the hypothesis that ASD may
be due to a limited or delayed Theory of Mind (ToM), the
ability to ascribe mental states, for example beliefs, to other
people. The book (Baron-Cohen, 1995) is the classic state-
ment of this view.
The Sally-Anne task given above, and another false-belief
task called the Smarties task, were formalized in (Braüner,
2013, 2014) using a natural deduction proof-system for hy-
brid modal logic taken from the book (Braüner, 2011), and
tracing back to (Seligman, 1997). The later paper (Braüner,
2015) considers what goes wrong when incorrect responses
are given to false-belief tasks.
Hybrid modal logic is an appropriate tool to analyse the
reasoning in these false-belief tasks since it can explicitly rep-
resent perspectives (perspectives can be named), and more-
over, the natural deduction system we use can explicitly rep-
resent shifts between different perspectives (it is dealt with by
a specific proof-rule).
Second-order false-belief tasks
The papers mentioned above dealt with first-order false-belief
tasks; they are psychological tests where the experimental
subject must ascribe a false-belief to another person. Han-
dling first-order false-beliefs correctly is viewed as a mile-
stone in the acquisition of ToM, one typically reached at the
age of four. The mastery of second-order false-beliefs is
a later milestone in ToM acquisition, one typically reached
at age six or seven. In a second-order false-belief task, the
subject must keep track of a second person’s belief about a
third person’s belief—it thus requires understanding of the
recursive character of mental states. Second-order false-
belief reasoning has been found to correlate with a number
of other abilities necessary for complex social interaction: id-
iom understanding, irony and sarcasm understanding and un-
derstanding of social emotions such as embarrassment; see
the book (Miller, 2012) for an overview. The recent paper
(Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015) also shows corre-
lation with peer coordination.
Much less is known about second-order false-belief un-
derstanding than its first-order cousin, in particular when it
comes to children with ASD; see (Miller, 2012). We have
published formalizations of second-order false-belief tasks
in the papers (Braüner, Blackburn, & Polyanskaya, 2016a,
2016b). The latter paper includes a logical comparison of the
four well known second-order false-belief tasks that can be
found in the literature, showing that they are logically distinct
and can be classified across two dimensions of variation.
These formalizations also highlights the importance of
recursion: they show that second-order reasoning can be
viewed as the recursive embedding of first-order reasoning
about different agents—but as recursive logics of belief are
more complex than those required to analyze first-order false-
belief tasks, processing issues are also relevant and should be
experimentally investigated.
Empirical study: Second-order social reasoning
in children with ASD
Our empirical line of work centers around the notion of
recursion. We have carried out a correlation and train-
ing study of second-order social reasoning competency in
45
high-functioning children with ASD, the hypothesis being
that training in linguistic recursion (in particular, handling
of sentential complements) will improve their social cogni-
tion skills, as measured by second-order false-belief tasks.
More precisely, we measure the second-order reasoning ca-
pacity using a composite score involving all four reasoning
patterns singled out by our logical analysis; see (Braüner et
al., 2016b). Our study involves 62 Danish-speaking children
with ASD. Results are in press; see (Polyanskaya, Braüner,
& Blackburn, 2018). See also (Polyanskaya, Blackburn, &
Braüner, 2017) for a more detailed discussion of the back-
ground ideas.
Comparison to other work
There have been few previous applications of logical methods
to false-belief tasks. The pioneering work is due to Stenning
and Van Lambalgen, who analyse the Sally-Anne and other
first-order false-belief tasks in terms of non-monotonic closed
world reasoning as used in logic programming; see their book
(Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2008). The paper (Arkoudas
& Bringsjord, 2008) describe how reasoning in the first-
order Sally-Anne test have been implemented in an interac-
tive theorem prover using axioms and proof-rules formulated
in a many-sorted first-order modal logic. Unlike our hybrid-
logical analyses, the proof-rules employed in (Stenning & van
Lambalgen, 2008) and (Arkoudas & Bringsjord, 2008) do not
explicitly formalize the perspective shift required to pass the
Sally-Anne test.
Applications of logical models to second-order false-belief
tasks are even rarer: a clear example is the use of Dynamic
Epistemic Logic in (Bolander, 2014), its main feature being
that reasoning is modeled with Kripke structures character-
izing the uncertainty of agents. This line of work models the
reasoning from a global perspective, that is, from the perspec-
tive of the modeler—see Section 5 of the paper (Verbrugge,
2009) for a general discussion of the problems with epistemic
logic as a model for human social cognition. It is also rele-
vant to mention the use of game theory in (Szymanik, Meijer-
ing, & Verbrugge, 2013) to investigate performance in higher-
order social reasoning.
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(Braüner, 2013))
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